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REFERENCES
Lennart SAMUELSON, Plans for Stalin’s war machine. Tukhachevskii and military-
economic planning 1925-1941. Basingstoke, MacMillan, 2000, 267 p.
1 Lennart  Samuelson has written a  comprehensive account of  Soviet  military planning
from the mid 1920s until the outbreak of the Second World War. He uses materials from
the formerly secret archives to obtain a behind-the-scene’s view of the political economy
of Soviet military planning. Samuelson’s book is the fourth significant book on the Soviet
military economy published over the past six years (see Simonov, Barber and Harrison),
providing  the  most  detailed  account  of  the  origins  of  the  Soviet  military-industrial
complex.1 It also links to Mark Harrison’s study of the Soviet military economy during
World War II.2 As a consequence of these publications, we have moved from a patchy
knowledge of  top-level  decision making in the Soviet  military complex to  a  body of
knowledge that compares with the civilian economy.
2 Samuelson’s  story  focuses  on  three  pivotal  figures  – Stalin,  K. Voroshilov,  and
M. Tukhachevskii. Voroshilov, the commissar of defense, is presented as a professional
bureaucrat, easily intimidated; Tukhachevskii as the far-sighted military strategist, who
designed the modern Soviet Red Army; and Stalin as the dictator who vacillates between
admiration  and  scorn  for  the  independent-minded  Tukhachevskii,  who  suffered  the
typical fate of strong-willed leaders under Stalin – execution. As the title suggests, the
author focuses on the creation of the system of military planning. Samuelson explains
that military planning was comprised of “plans for war” and “mobilization requests” that
were  only  loosely  integrated  into  national  economic  plans.  The  plans  for  war  were
devised by the military, largely under Tukhachevskii’s direction. These plans spelled out
the needs of the military during the first year of war and then for subsequent years of
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war. National economic plans and mobilization requests were supposed to be based on
these plans for war. Drawing up the various plans of war was complicated by the fact that,
although  there  was  a  consensus  that  war  was  inevitable,  the  enemy  could  not  be
identified so easily.  Thus various plans of  war anticipated Japan,  Poland,  or Romania
(backed by France)  as  potential  combatants.  Only late in the game was the eventual
protagonist  – Nazi  Germany –  identified.  Not  knowing  the  enemy or  the  duration  of
hostilities  made  military  planning  extremely  uncertain,  raising  doubts  that  military
planning was even possible.  The actual  planning of  defense eventually  fell  upon the
defense industry administration of Gosplan, which remained under civilian rule, despite
the military’s attempt to direct it. The actual military plan was, in reality, comprised of
the defense budget, which had to compete for resources with other budget claimants and
of  mobilization  orders  that  were  negotiated  between  the  military  and  the  defense
industry administration of the commissariat of heavy industry. The relationship between
the  military  and  the  commissariat  of  heavy  industry  under  S.  Ordzhonikidze  was
complex.  The military supported Ordzhonikidze’s claims for more resources for basic
heavy industries, under the assumption that military power depends on steel, coal, and
transportation  equipment.  The  military  and  Ordzhonikidze,  however,  disagreed  on
specifics with Ordzhonikidze attempting to avoid difficult defense orders.
3 The mobilization orders were the true defense plans, just as the quarterly plans were the
true operational plans of the economy. Despite the priority of defense orders, there were
dramatic failures in their fulfillment, such as disastrous results for tank production in
1932, and the massive failure to fulfill the 1937 mobilization requests. There was no first
five-year plan for defense,  and the second five-year plan for defense was drafted by
Gosplan’s defense sector with great difficulty. Much defense planning took place outside of
the formal planning hierarchy in informal meetings in Stalin’s study. Military budgets
were not met, and the impression that one gains from Samuelson is that planning for war
was as chaotic as planning for industrialization.3 Military planning was complicated not
only by the natural uncertainty of international politics, but also by secrecy issues. Often
plans for war were prepared in only three copies that ordinary civilian planners never
saw.
4 Samuelson has written an admirable book. It is concise and provides a coherent account
of the manner in which the top Soviet leadership stumbled towards a system of military
planning. Several decades back, we knew virtually nothing about this subject. The team
headed by Abram Bergson to calculate Soviet growth had to rely on bits and pieces of
random information to estimate defense spending.4 Samuelson now routinely provides
detailed breakdowns of defense budgets, production targets, and the like, which can be
used to revise these calculations. If Samuelson’s book contains a major surprise it is that
plan failures in the defense sector may have been just as large as in the civilian sector
despite  the  overwhelming  priority  of  defense.  Supposedly,  the  strength  of  the
administrative command system was its ability to meet priority targets; yet Samuelson
shows that general failures of the civilian economy translated into major failures in the
defense sector.
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3.  For an account of civilian planning also based on the archives, see: Paul Gregory, The political
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4.  Abram Bergson, The real national income of Soviet Russia since 1928  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1961).
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